Hints at Improvements to the Infrastructure Reports?

A few days ago I had the opportunity to attend Bike Maryland‘s 2024 Bike Symposium in Annapolis. This was the second time I’ve attended this event and it was a great opportunity to hear from some key people for biking and active transportation in Maryland. If you’re interested in road safety for vulnerable road users, I highly recommend this annual event.

One of the speakers at Bike Symposium was MDOT SHA’s Administrator, William Pines. Administrator Pines indicated that he had few prepared remarks and wanted to mostly take questions and interact with the audience, so I had to bring up the Fatal Crash Infrastructure Reviews. Unfortunately there is no video of this part of the Symposium, so I’m working from my own memory and will only have approximations on the question and answer.

First, I should say, Administrator Pines talked quite a bit about the issues that Bike Symposium attendees will care about – trails, infrastructure, a commitment to active transportation and safety.

I had not spent a lot of time preparing my question, because I did not realize that Administrator Pines would be taking so many questions, but the gist of my question was approximately “You have spoken at length about active transportation and safety, but with respect to the Vision Zero Implementation Act of 2022, why has SHA only published 2 reviews since the end of November, not keeping up with the rate of fatal crashes, and why don’t these reviews contain all the elements required by the law?”

I am caught in the act of asking why only two Infrastructure Reviews had been posted in the prior 2.5 months.

Administrator Pines’s answer was not totally satisfying to me. He keyed in directly to my statement about meeting the elements of the law and noted that he had reviewed this program with the legal team and they are definitely fully complying with the law. (I think he also referenced the Attorney General, but perhaps I misheard that, it strikes me a strange that the office of the Attorney General would be looking at this). Administrator Pines also expressed a commitment to the program, which is good. Unfortunately he did not address the rate of report publication over the past few months.

So how can I square Administrator Pines’s remarks with my judgment of the program’s compliance so far?

I have a theory that the reports are in the process of improving, but to explain why I’d be willing to give the State Highway Administration the benefit of the doubt after all my previous concerns, I think it’s worth considering and discarding some alternative theories.

Theory #1 – Incorrect Statement of Fact

Intentionally Incorrect – I’m not even going to consider this, just get it out of the way to start with. Setting aside that I have no reason to question Administrator Pines’s integrity, in the real world I don’t think you see people nominated into leadership positions like this default to lying in the face of relatively weak questioning. There are much more general ways to answer if the goal was to dodge the question, this was a specific and factual statement. Large organizations are complex and deal with sensitive topics, there’s plenty of options for explaining observed behavior without resorting to malign intent.

Unintentionally Incorrect – I don’t think this is particularly worthy of consideration either. It was a specific and factual statement that struck me as something Administrator Pines felt confident that he had the facts correct.

Theory #2 – MDOT SHA is Doing Everything the Law Requires, They’re Just Not Telling Anyone

I don’t think this makes a lot of sense, but this should be considered. What if SHA is doing all the review elements required by the law but just not including them in the public report? Perhaps they have identified some privacy or liability reason to not publish some elements and thus the internal version of the infrastructure reports meet all requirements, but the public reports appear lacking. It’s not explicit that the report published on the MDOT SHA website must be identical to the official internal report, but it’s pretty close. I’m definitely not a lawyer, but this just seems… unsatisfying.

Also, “privacy concerns” is an easy answer that’s hard to disprove from the outside. If the answer were “we’re doing the homework, we just can’t publish all of it publicly due to ____ constraint”, that’s a more satisfying answer to give than the unsupported statement that was made.

Theory #3 – Really Tight Reading of the Law

I’m not going to lie, having Administrator Pines state unequivocally that SHA is compliant to the law has me double-checking my rationale. For example, under the requirement of Transportation Article, Section 8-204.2 (D) (1), MDOT SHA has six months from the date of notification by law enforcement to complete the review and then (D) (2) requires that the report be published publicly on their website. I suppose that since the six month deadline is tied to review completion, not publication, MDOT SHA could be fully compliant and sitting on a pile of completed, but unpublished, Infrastructure Reports.

Similarly, one could argue that (B)(2) – which requires appropriate corrective actions and countermeasures – could be arguably met since the engineering team judged “No Deficiency” so frequently. But this does not explain how one addresses my objections to their handling of sections (C)(1), (C)(2), and (C)(3). Unless…

Theory #4 – MDOT SHA is Presently Compliant, Report Publication Delays Prevent Me from Appreciating This

Consider the statement “We are fully compliant with the law”¹, it does not include any temporal reference. It does not say if this was always true or when it became a true statement, this is a statement of current status. Perhaps when Administrator Pines indicated that he had met with his legal team to review compliance, this was not some meeting that occurred months ago, but a recent interaction that came readily to mind. Perhaps a meeting that was establishing that yes, after making process changes or improvements, MDOT SHA is now fully checking all the boxes on the law.

I should note, under this theory you don’t have to assume that that Administrator Pines was being disingenuous at all in his answer. This is something you can chalk up to internal vs public information in a large organization. For Administrator Pines, the reality of the Infrastructure Review program is how the reviews are being done today because he can call up the project manager and ask. For me, the reality of the Infrastructure Review program is how the reviews were being done for the first nine month of the program (Oct 2022 – Jun 2023) because that’s all the data I had when I asked the question.

And guess what! There is now some evidence that “Theory #4” is, in fact, correct!

Last weekend I noticed 3 new Infrastructure Reviews had been published; the contents of one in particular piqued my interest. 4/10/2023 – US 301 (Crain Hwy), Bowie, Prince George’s County contains some interesting elements.

1. It clearly identifies that the modes of transportation using the road (per (C)(2)), or, at least, which mode the road is not designed for (pedestrians).
2. It discusses future countermeasures to be installed nearby that may reduce crash opportunities (per (B)(2)).
3. It notes that there are no other pedestrian fatality crashes in the vicinity (per (C)(3)… well, I could quibble about only looking at fatal crashes instead of all crashes).
4. It notes the land use context for this section of road (per (C)(1)).

In short, this is the first report that I’ve seen include all four of those elements! And, I can’t help but notice this detail – the crash study period was January 1, 2020 through October 31, 2023. The site visit for the Infrastructure Review was May 18, 2023, so the crash data review was performed over six months later, sometime in November 2023² at least. It’s possible this report was updated to include these additional elements as part of an improved process at MDOT SHA.

In the few reports that I have seen published in 2024³, I have noticed that the reports now state the land use context in the findings section. I will also welcome the addition of short crash history discussions. Although the 4/10/2023 crash review did not recommend any new countermeasures, this is also one of the few times where I agree with the findings. I hope that soon I will be able to move on from complaining that this analysis has not been done to advocating for the countermeasures recommended by the analysis. Even if we see more disclaimers like this “The countermeasures are an Engineering Upgrades and do not indicate any deficiency at the time of inspection”, it will be an improvement and a step forward.

Finally, It is not lost on me that Administrator Pines has been the head of SHA for about 6 months (named in August 2023). This means he inherited the nascent and incomplete implementation of this law that has formed the vast majority of the reports I’ve had to review. If he or his team have implemented changes to policy and process, the observed disruption and delay to report publication would not be surprising.

At the Bike Symposium, Administrator Pines certainly spoke on road safety and active transportation in a positive, collaborative manner; I very much hope I’ll see SHA deliver on that rhetoric over the coming months. Yes, I’m choosing to take the charitable reading of the answer I was given, perhaps that will turn out to be naive, but I’d always prefer to assume a good faith effort if possible.

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1. Please note, I would not consider this a direct quote, I don’t have a recording or exact transcript, but this is my impression of the gist of the response to my question. ↩︎
2. Which, I’ll note, is just after October 27th when I highlighted these missing elements at the MBPAC meeting. ↩︎
3. Five crashes: 5/31, 6/21, 4/10, 8/12 and 8/21, ordered by publication date. ↩︎

Maryland is not so Different

A couple months ago I was pointed to a really good post (via ACT for Transit on Bluesky) on road fatalities in Connecticut:

Lessons from Mapping Death by Kerri Ana Provost

If you click through the link, you’ll find a summary the author has written after spending a few year mapping all the pedestrian fatalities in their state from 2015 through to the end of 2023 (the time of the article). If you’ve read much of my work and commentary on this website, you’re not going to be surprised, but you’ll be struck by the eerie parallels in the findings and the sense of desperation. The complete sense that it’s not a lack of data or proven crash countermeasures, but a lack of empathy and imagination on the part of those with the power to make our roads safer.

Here are some of the author’s findings and parallels we see here in Maryland:

• Pedestrians and cyclists get killed where there are no sidewalks – I go on and on and on about this, including in the most recent crash review I’ve done
• Multi-lane roads are deadly – There are so many examples of this when examines the MDOT SHA Infrastructure Reviews
• Crosswalks help. They are not magical. - One of the first crash reviews highlights this fact, but there are more examples
• Zero thought is given to location of bus stops. – Yes! This is absolutely true in Maryland, see here, here or here

Interestingly, probably because Kerri Ana Provost is tracking all pedestrian deaths in Connecticut and not just focused on state-managed road deaths, she has a few trends that I haven’t been seeing:

• Rural mailboxes are a problem. – I have not been tracking this one, I’m not sure if Maryland is better about mailbox placement, or better about it on state highways, or I lacked the imagination to see this, or if this just hasn’t come up in the available data I’ve reviewed yet. This is, however, a good observation.
• Younger adults get killed on highways. – Since I’ve been only reviewing highway deaths, I haven’t contrasted against overall pedestrian fatalities.
• Children get killed in driveways. – I’m glad I’m only looking at highway deaths, as much as I’m emotionally struck by the deaths I do read up on for these reviews, I don’t think I could do it for a lot of children.
• Large vehicles are as much of a problem as you’ve read about nationally. – I have not been consistently looking at the make/model of the vehicle striking the pedestrian/cyclist. I have not noticed a pattern in the reviews I’m doing, but that is also likely because I’m reviewing highway fatality reports and all the vehicles are traveling at high speeds. At the sort of speeds you see from highways (40+ mph), even smaller cars are deadly, which is why it’s so important that MDOT SHA actually follow their Context Driven Guide for setting speed limits based on the surrounding land use!

Although this was not on the author’s list of findings, she definitely highlights how most pedestrian fatalities, even in clusters, result in no infrastructure changes at all. Perhaps that’s more understandable in Connecticut, without an infrastructure review process, but Maryland has a law on the books for state highways and a webpage – yet nothing is happening here either.

However, the one positive takeaway from reading Kerri Ana Provost’s post is just how grateful I am for the work of the MDOT MVA Highway Safety Office on their new Fatal Crash Dashboard. Kerri Ana Provost had to spend innumerable hours individually mapping the deaths and creating her own heat maps; I can quickly access this sort of data from a state-managed reference map to reinforce my commentary. The navigation leaves a little to be desired and the crash metadata is very thin, but at least the state administration cares enough to fund the maintenance of this project.

Finally, on the topic of despair, there’s a quote within Kerri Ana Povost’s post that really resonated with me:

The experts know what safer road design looks like. This is not a national secret. We don’t need endless street audits; we need action.

Kerri Ana Provost, https://www.realhartford.org/2023/12/08/lessons-from-mapping-death/

This is so absolutely true in Maryland. We have a quite knowledgeable and active Vision Zero program, only it’s housed within the Motor Vehicle Administration and has no direct power over road design. We have dedicated individuals within the State Highway Administration’s central office, they have published a pretty solid Context Driven Design Guide¹, but apparently each SHA District (where the actual engineering and design work is done) is wholly independent and unaccountable for following this guide. We have a state legislature that cares enough to pass not only Vision Zero legislation, but the Vision Zero Implementation Act of 2022, only to have MDOT SHA fail to follow the law.

At this point, I find it ever more difficult to empathize with the highway engineers, planners and managers in the various SHA District offices. I generally have a lot of respect for civil servants, it’s a largely thankless job that doesn’t get a lot of praise, but it is important. I even believe that a lot of the bureaucratic activities have their uses. But I just can’t understand why everyone can see the problem with road safety except those who are most responsible for the design and implementation.

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1. The Context Driven Design Guide was published in March 2021, this is no longer a new development, it should be in use! ↩︎

Road Safety in the Banner & Green Shoots?

The Baltimore Banner Analyzes Pedestrian and Bicycle Crashes

This week The Baltimore Banner published a pretty good article on the continued increase in pedestrian and cyclist deaths – Banner analysis: Pedestrian deaths rise in Maryland, drop in Baltimore

The Banner captures that while pedestrian deaths have risen across the state, Baltimore has actually managed to basically hold constant in terms of pedestrians killed on the road in 2023. 

The Banner credits it as a slight decrease, but I’m not sure why. The Zero Deaths Maryland Fatal Crash Dashboard has 19 pedestrian deaths in 2022 and 20 pedestrian deaths in 2023. (Though if you add in other vulnerable road users, there were 22 deaths in each 2022 and 2023.) For whatever reason, the Banner is reporting this in “per 100k residents” terms, rather than focusing on whole numbers so it makes it hard to check the exact math. They also flip back and forth between reporting information based on total pedestrian and cyclist crashes and fatal pedestrian and cyclist crashes (possibly equivalent to the Fatal Crash Dashboards “Non-Motorist” totals, possibly not). The one table where they break out the data, they state Baltimore City had 15 deaths for pedestrians and cyclists in 2023, but that’s just not correct. The Banner points to the Maryland State Police as their data source, the State Police do seem to own the crash database, and it does not seem to be easily related to the authority investigating (see image below).

Actually, I walked away from this and then came back and thought of another way to slice the data. According to the Fatal Crash Dashboard, in 2023, five of the pedestrian deaths and one cyclist death in Baltimore City occurred “Off Road” (does this mean in a parking lot??)¹. If you exclude those, then we’re looking at 15 Pedestrians, 0 Bicyclists, and 1 Other Non-Motorist. If you exclude the Other Non-Motorist, there’s your 15 pedestrians.

Anyway, I came here to praise the article, not dispute their analysis. I’m happy to see road safety for pedestrian and cyclists getting positive news coverage. On to the meat of the article.

The Banner’s analysis, based on the data they received and using population as a divisor to develop the statistic of interest, tried to understand why some areas of the state are seeing differing results from others. The Banner notes that city officials have credited the implementation of their Complete Streets policy since 2021 in these improvements. I think it’s worth adding another piece of context to that.

The other major difference between Baltimore City and every other county-level jurisdiction in Maryland is that Baltimore City controls the design of every road in the jurisdiction, state and federal highways included. In every other part of the state, a local jurisdiction can influence the highway design, but MDOT SHA has the final say. This is really important for two major reasons:

1. State roads routinely account for ~70% of all fatal pedestrian and cyclist crashes in the state of Maryland (see my New Year’s Day post or my presentation to MBPAC for the details)
2. MDOT SHA is not even correctly implementing these Fatal Crash Infrastructure Reviews properly, much less showing a district-level commitment to Vision Zero

So the bottom line is, jurisdictions such as Princes George’s County (called out in The Banner article for their distressingly high per capita pedestrian death rates) can have the best Complete Streets manual and a dynamite local road safety plan, but none of that matter as the roads with the vast majority of the fatalities are managed by a state agency. What’s going on in Prince George’s County?

It’s not a mystery – Prince George’s County suffers from having been developed predominantly around suburban arterials that are maintained as state roads by MDOT SHA. These arterials are where the bus routes are, this is where the commercial businesses are located, where the restaurants are, these are the main “through” streets of the county because individual suburban developments tend to have cul de sacs rather than through roads. But the county government does not control them and must rely on MDOT SHA to make them safe for vulnerable road users.

The bottom line: MDOT SHA is failing Prince George’s County. 

This is also a good time to make the point that per capita fatal crash metrics for pedestrians and bicyclists are a bad way to measure things across the state of Maryland (or any state really). Carroll County had very few pedestrian and bicyclist deaths in 2023. Is that because Carroll County is well designed for pedestrian and cyclist safety? No! It’s because Carroll County is so car dependent that there’s nowhere to walk and no one trying to walk there. What cyclists you do see out are, like me, road cycling enthusiasts enjoying the open countryside. These are not utility cyclists or commuters. Frankly, if we could measure pedestrian fatalities per mile traveled on foot by residents, I suspect Carroll County would not do well compared to Baltimore City. Unfortunately the only way to compare these statistics is either as time series or by matching land use/road conditions well, which just isn’t going to work based on Maryland’s county-level jurisdictions.

One final point on The Banner’s article, they interviewed / received comment from MDOT MVA Administrator Christine Nizer. This makes sense because Maryland’s State Highway Safety Office (SHSO) is within the MVA, the SHSO is the owner of Maryland’s Vision Zero program. Nizer indicated that the actions that MVA is taking in response to the consistent trend of increasing pedestrian and cyclist fatalities is… more education! From the article:

In the meantime, the MVA is doubling down on education and has launched its first campaign to encourage drivers to remain in a malfunctioning or disabled vehicle instead of standing on the roadway. Campaigns will look different for dense urban centers like Baltimore to encourage use of crosswalks, increased visibility and driver awareness.

There’s a reason why the MVA Administrator is focused on “Education” programs – Maryland’s Strategic Highway Safety Plan remains locked in the “Four E’s” paradigm for highway safety:

1. Engineering
2. Enforcement
3. Education
4. Emergency Medical Services

But how do those Four E’s map organizationally?

1. Engineering – not part of the MVA
2. Enforcement – not part of the MVA, at least, as generally conceived in this context
3. Education – part of the Vision Zero program in the MVA
4. Emergency Medical Services – not part of the MVA

So the MVA Administrator answered the question in the way one would expect of a department chief, they answered with the actions that they know they can commit resources to complete. One never wants to make commitments for another department that may have different priorities. The real question should be – how effective is Education at improving road safety? Is that really all we can be doing?

For example, the Maryland MVA is the agency that licenses vehicles. Recently it’s become very apparent that larger vehicles are much more dangerous for pedestrians and other vulnerable road users and likely contributing to the nationwide increases in fatal crashes. Perhaps, instead of telling people who live in dense urban areas about the benefits of crosswalks, Administrator Nizer should review the statutory power the MVA may have to regulate the size and weight of the vehicles in those dense urban areas. Within the article, Administrator Nizer points out that speeds are a major contributing factor to fatal crashes – perhaps her team could spend some time reviewing the statutory power the MVA has or would need to mandate the use of intelligent speed assist on new vehicles as the EU is doing. Administrator Nizer should consider how her agency can add some Enforcement to their portfolio in addition to all the Education.

Please note, though, I am not against all road safety education. In particular, I noticed the comment about a new education program to encourage drivers to stay within their disabled vehicles on interstate highways. Credit where due, I have personally wondered “What can we do about all these people getting hit and killed on Interstates?” and had no answers myself. This is probably a good new program and will save some lives.

But please, don’t spend any more money telling people to use crosswalks. Instead, spend that money understanding why people aren’t using the crosswalks at particularly dangerous locations and what can be done about that (such as moving a bus stop closer to the crosswalk!).

Green Shoots?

Last week, when The Banner article came out on Wednesday, I checked the MDOT SHA Infrastructure Review page and, just as it had been for the last 6 weeks, the total number of reports read 43. Imagine my surprise then, Saturday, when I happened to check and see that the counter had ticked up to 44!

There’s nothing too remarkable about the fatal crash reviewed (5/31/2023 – MD 27 (Ridge Rd), near Mt. Airy, Howard County), but I did notice that the this review included a couple aspects that I’ve been critical of these reports for not including. I noticed that the site inspection was performed in July, so this is one of the first reports where the site visit and notes would have been done after I initially provided feedback to SHA. There is still a lot more I’d like to see in these reports, but I find it encouraging to see even minor improvements.

First and foremost, I hope that this 44th report unsticks whatever is blocking the pipeline to publishing these Infrastructure Reviews. I’d really like to see this project push MDOT SHA to engage on Vision Zero and take their responsibility for “Engineering” seriously, even as I know more pedestrians and cyclists will die as MDOT SHA moves agonizingly slowly towards compliance.

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1. I’m highly suspicious of this “Off Road” data field. I’m to believe that there were 6 Non-Motorist and an additional 6 Motorist fatalities in Off Road crashes in Baltimore City in a single year? Look at where some of these “Off Road” crashes resolve to:
   
   This sure sounds like it happened on a street, like US 1 from the looks of the map.
   
   
   Here’s another one, definitely looks like a crash on a street, a state highway this time.
   
   
   And finally, here’s one from the “Other” category:
   Collision Type is “Other” – I wonder if that means it’s a pedestrian collision.  Wonder if there’s a news release?  Sure enough:  Media Advisories: Sept. 11 | Baltimore Police Department
   “Upon arrival, officers and medics rendered aid to an unidentified victim who was struck by a vehicle while running across the street.”
   And there you have it… looks people are choosing “Off Road” incorrectly on the forms in Baltimore City.  This seems to have lead to The Baltimore Banner’s analysis team has come to the incorrect conclusion. 
   
   This work is so depressing, even when it looks like there is good news (pedestrian deaths down in Baltimore City!), it just evaporates when you look closely at it.  Plus, imagine trying to explain to Baltimore City DOT now that they really do have to follow the Complete Streets design manual because pedestrian deaths are up, the Baltimore Banner just did an analysis and said they were improving!
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Going Dormant?

It may appear that I have not updated this website in awhile and that I have dropped off in tracking MDOT SHA’s Infrastructure Reports. The last update I made was on November 30, 2023, when I reviewed the report on the 3/16/2023 crash US 29 in Columbia. This was the 43rd report published by MDOT SHA and my 43rd review. A quick check of the MDOT SHA website today shows:

Screen capture of MDOT SHA Pedestrian & Bicyclist Fatalities – Infrastructure Review map widget from 1/1/2024 showing a total of 43 assessments.

So, you see, I haven’t lost interest in this program – Maryland’s State Highway Administration has. No reports were uploaded to the website in the entire month of December 2023.

These reviews are to be completed within 6 months of notification of the crash by law enforcement and published openly. This is another example of MDOT SHA failing to comply with plain text of the law.

The failure to complete Fatality Infrastructure Reviews that comply with state law and public commitments is especially galling in light of a continued increase in fatal crashes on our roadways.

An image of a Bluesky post highlighting that 2023 was the most deadly year on Maryland roads since 2007. Has to be a screenshot, WordPress does not yet support Bluesky embeds.

Per the Maryland Highway Safety Office’s Fatal Crash Dashboard, in the last couple days since that Bluesky post, Maryland totaled 600 deaths due to crashes this year. This includes 153 pedestrians and 15 cyclists. These are, of course, preliminary numbers as the Fatal Crash Dashboard is a real time reporting mechanism and not all fatalities occur immediately after the crash or are reported in real time. Nonetheless, if these numbers hold, that’s a 17.7% increase in pedestrian deaths and a 27% increase in cyclist deaths over 2022.

Image of a table summarizing the Non-Motorist Fatal Crash Data for the 5-years 2019-2023. State-maintained roads account for two-thirds of all fatal crashes for non-motorists.

It’s so disappointing that the agency responsible for the design, construction and maintenance of the roads that account for two-thirds of all fatal crashes in Maryland is not more vigorously pursuing solutions to prevent fatal crashes.

Image of a table comparing, by calendar quarter, the Fatal Crash Dashboard-reported Non-Motorists Killed on State Roads with MDOT SHA’s Fatality Infrastructure Reports published through 12/31/2023.

The above table is somewhat unnecessary, but I think it really illustrates how MDOT SHA has just stopped publishing infrastructure reports. There is passable coverage for the first quarter, which drops off precipitously in the first quarter of 2023, followed by just complete silence starting in April 2023. Not a single report for a fatal crash in has been published for May or June 2023.

This is somewhat confusing to me, because whenever I review the reports, it’s clear that the site visits seem to have been done promptly and, it seems, the initial check-box reports write-up. I’ve been confused for a long time why the report indicate that the on-site assessment was done a week after the crash but the report isn’t published for months. Having some department review for publication makes sense, but why does it takes months? And why has it broken down in late 2023? Is it something as mundane as “so-and-so who maintains the website took a new position”?

I don’t know, I remain optimistic that this program could be a force for positive change on our state roadways, but I get ever more pessimistic about MDOT SHA being the ones to implement it.

Hello Strong Towns

This morning I was pleasantly surprised to find this work was featured by the national Strong Towns Monday morning email! They have a write-up on this project on the national website: Monitoring the Monitors: Maryland Man Scrutinizes State DOT Crash Reports

I am, indeed, a member of the local Strong Towns Baltimore group though this is not an official “Strong Towns Baltimore project”. However, to give credit where due, I don’t know I’d have gotten this far with the project if I were not a member of Strong Towns Baltimore. Members of the group have reviewed my in-progress work, provided feedback and encouraged me to continue advocating. For me, knowing that at least a few people would be interested in my work and expecting me to follow-up was a helpful accountability mechanism. I would say that, overall, joining the Strong Towns Baltimore group has lead me to really step up my civic engagement.

However, at least as important as feedback from a local group of fellow amateur advocates was the feedback and encouragement from Nigel Samaroo of Bike Maryland. Bike Maryland is one of the advocacy organizations that helped get the law passed in the first place and has contributed to other key vulnerable road user safety laws over the past few years.

This post is probably up too late for most of the traffic from the Strong Towns article, but if you live in Maryland and come to the same conclusions as I have about how these Fatal Crash Infrastructure Reviews should be improved, please consider contacting your local elected officials to let them know. Your local County Council member or state delegate/senator is a powerful multiplying force and, depending on where you live, the local jurisdiction DOT may also be on-board.

Finally, for fellow Marylanders, please consider supporting Bike Maryland and/or your local bike/ped advocacy organization (such as Bikemore, WABA or BikeAAA). If you’re in the Baltimore area, consider getting involved with Strong Towns Baltimore, either in our forum or an in-person meeting. If you’re further afield, contact Bike Maryland to see if there are local advocacy groups in your area.

Presentation to the Maryland Bicycle and Pedestrian Advisory Committee

This morning I had the opportunity to make a presentation on this project to the Maryland Bicycle and Pedestrian Advisory Committee at the invitation of Nigel Samaroo.

The presentation went really well and I really appreciate the opportunity to present at such a high visibility forum. See below for my presentation.

fatal-crash-infrastructure-reviews-presentation-to-mbpac-27-oct-2023Download

Where to Start

A short post, but potentially relevant. I’m expecting a large influx of folks to this website later this week after I present on MDOT SHA’s Fatal Crash Infrastructure Reviews at the Maryland Bicycle and Pedestrian Advisory Committee (MBPAC).

If you’re looking at this website and want to understand where to start, I would recommend starting with the most recent crashes first. Generally those will be the ones I’m reviewing most recently and benefit greatly from my thinking and background work on the first 20 or so reviews. While it is tempting to read in chronological order, I know that my better work comes in some of the later reviews.

Is MDOT SHA Upholding their Public Commitments?

What has MDOT SHA committed to?

My source for what MDOT SHA committed to with respect to the Vision Zero Implementation Act of 2022 is mostly the Pedestrian and Bicycle Fatalities Infrastructure Review website. Generally, here are what I consider commitments to how the reviews will be performed.

The very first section of text on the website states:

Fatal crashes are preventable¹
At the Maryland State Highway Administration (MDOT SHA), we believe that crashes are preventable and one death on our roads is one too many. Maryland uses a multi-disciplinary approach to crash prevention and severity mitigation, including strategies that address roadway design. After fatal crashes occur on MDOT SHA-maintained roadways, traffic engineers review and evaluate surrounding highway infrastructure to determine if improvements are needed.

Next under the section describing Evaluations:

Highway Infrastructure Related Crash²
MDOT SHA evaluates all fatal crashes on state highways to determine whether any of the following were a factor: road surface, road segments (curves, grade, number of lanes, shoulder condition, width of lanes), junction type (gradient, length, sight distance, conflict points), road ancillary assets (traffic barriers, delineators, pavement markings, streetlights), and work zones.

Context Driven Improvements
MDOT SHA also evaluates fatal crashes to identify whether our streets are designed for safety in a way that supports the land uses that surround them. Engineers are encouraged to seek out innovative design treatments, especially in areas where there are needs or challenges that cannot be easily addressed by standard elements.

While these are “soft” requirements rather than the “hard” legal requirements of Section 8-204.2 of the Maryland Transportation Article (the section of law created by the Vision Zero Implementation Act of 2022), I feel that it is also worth evaluating. These sort of public commitments and statements are valued by advocates such as myself, it is heartening to know that at least some level of MDOT SHA understands what should be done. However, if the content of the reports does not align to public commitments, then it leads me to believe that the part of the organization that believes in Vision Zero has no influence on the part of the organization that designs deadly roads.

Compliance Table

Commitment	Meeting Commitment?	Comment
At [MDOT SHA], we believe that crashes are preventable and one death on our roads is one too many.	No	See below
After fatal crashes occur on MDOT SHA-maintained roadways, traffic engineers review and evaluate surrounding highway infrastructure to determine if improvements are needed.	Conditional	Meeting commitment only if you define “improvements” to be “maintenance”.
MDOT SHA evaluates all fatal crashes on state highways to determine whether any of the following were a factor	Yes
MDOT SHA also evaluates fatal crashes to identify whether our streets are designed for safety in a way that supports the land uses that surround them.	No	No use of Context Driven Guidelines

Since these are general statements of intent and policy, my position that MDOT SHA in not meeting such loose statements may seem a bit aggressive. But after going through all 36 reports published to date, I feel I have strong arguments in my favor.

I am going to discuss my negative conclusions from the bottom of the table up, because to some extent I’ve covered the later items already in another post and the meat of this post is on that first row.

“MDOT SHA also evaluates fatal crashes to identify whether our streets are designed for safety in a way that supports the land uses that surround them.”

This is a clear reference to the Context Driven Design Guidelines and Countermeasures. If this is happening, it’s not being published as part of the reports, as I’ve documented in my previous post on compliance with the law (which requires the consideration of the local context in subsection (C)(1)).

I know that I’ve already written at length about my disappointment on this front. However, I’d like to underline here that it’s all the more demoralizing to see MDOT SHA fail to follow through even with a voluntarily commitment on top of the law’s requirement.

“After fatal crashes occur on MDOT SHA-maintained roadways, traffic engineers review and evaluate surrounding highway infrastructure to determine if improvements are needed.”

Just as the previous statement corresponded to the non-compliance with subsection (C)(1) of the Vision Zero Implementation Act of 2022, this statement is analogous to the partial compliance with subsection (B)(2). With very limited exception, the Infrastructure Reviews are exclusively concerned with existing infrastructure and make no consideration of possible additions or changes to the existing roadway design. See my previous post for further discussion.

“At [MDOT SHA], we believe that crashes are preventable and one death on our roads is one too many.”

I do not believe that the various individuals completing these Infrastructure Reviews subscribe to the idea that “one death on our roads is one too many.”

There is no checkbox for this, so how do I know?

Well, consider this entire website. If you read through my reviews, you’ll see I spend some time with Google Maps, Google StreetView, new reporting, web searches, even maps of local park trails, to try to understand how the vulnerable road user (almost always a pedestrian) found themselves in this situation. Then I think for a bit, “what design elements could have reduced the likelihood of such a crash?” In many, many, many instances I am able to make some suggestions where the official MDOT SHA response is “No Deficiency / No action needed.” Often, my recommendations are as simple and low-impact as “build a sidewalk” in a development context that would clearly call for such infrastructure. The fact that the majority of Infrastructure Reviews call for no action shows that a lack of commitment to Vision Zero.

But that’s not my only evidence.

This statement should really be the guiding principle of the Infrastructure Reviewers and this entire program. This principle, if held, would lead to full compliance with the sub-section (B)(2) of Section 8-204.2 that requires the identification of crash reduction countermeasures. The entirety of my previous post on compliance with the law is an indictment of MDOT SHA’s commitment to the idea that fatal crashes are preventable.

But that’s not even my final argument, beyond even these themes is a subtle demonstration of how MDOT SHA, writ large, is not approaching these reviews with a “Zero Deaths” mindset.

The bottom line for me comes in the free-text field at the end of every report. The sections for “Initial Findings, Observations, and/or Recommendations” and “Additional Information Relevant to this Review.” Too frequently I’ve found these sections populated with comments that are irrelevant to project of improving infrastructure to reduce crashes, but entirely relevant if the author wishes to blame the fatal victim of the crash.

• Victim was wearing “dark-colored clothing” – 3/4/2023
• Victim had been drinking / was intoxicated – 1/21/2023, 3/4/2023
• Victim was improperly in the roadway / not in a crosswalk / did not yield to traffic – 10/28/2022, 11/11/2022, 1/1/2023, 1/21/2023, 3/4/2023
• Victim behavior was a contributing factor – 1/12/2023, 3/8/2023

I’ve made the case, specifically and clearly in my 3/4/2023 write-up, that people can not be expected to choose their clothing based on if they might later need to cross a street and that pedestrians are allowed to drink alcohol. As a highway safety advocate, I want people who have been drinking to be pedestrians (or pedestrians en route to/from transit) rather than drunk drivers. This is the classic victim blaming / windshield perspective that we see in police reports. While we should all promote more effective police reporting on vulnerable road user crashes, MDOT SHA should not take police report that assigns “fault” to pedestrians as a reason to halt inquiry into infrastructure improvements.

Humans making risky or “bad” choices is a potential indicator of poor infrastructure design.

The more frequently cited issue, though, is that the victim’s behavior or crossing choice was negligent, with the unstated conclusion that this exonerates the infrastructure design. There are two reasons that this is the wrong attitude:

1. Infrastructure and the built environment dramatically influence human behavior, but in predictable ways. If you have bus stops on either side of a divided highway and you make safe crossing inconvenient (or don’t provide it at all), you should not be surprised to find pedestrians in the roadway outside of a crosswalk. Humans making risky or “bad” choices is a potential indicator of poor infrastructure design.
2. This thinking goes completely against the US DOT’s “Safe System” approach, which makes two key points:

Humans Make Mistakes

People will inevitably make mistakes and decisions that can lead or contribute to crashes, but the transportation system can be designed and operated to accommodate certain types and levels of human mistakes, and avoid death and serious injuries when a crash occurs.

Redundancy is Crucial

Reducing risks requires that all parts of the transportation system be strengthened, so that if one part fails, the other parts still protect people.

https://www.transportation.gov/NRSS/SafeSystem

Essentially, this boils down to one of the key points I took away from Jessie Singer’s book There are No Accidents – if your design/product/road is only safe to use under ideal conditions, it is not safe at all. You have to assume that humans will make mistakes and provide design solutions that “fail safe” or mitigate catastrophic outcomes. Given that each of these Infrastructure Reviews takes place after a catastrophic outcome, MDOT SHA should be more hesitant to conclude nothing should be done.

I will, however, close out this discussion with some hope and credit where it is due. There are a very limited examples of some proactive measures being taken:

• 10/6/2022 (not part of the report, but I discovered that MDOT SHA later lowered the speed limit on this section of road)
• 10/8/2022 (recommended the use of Continental Style crosswalk, while I disagreed somewhat, this does indicated awareness of the Context Driven Countermeasures)
• 2/9/2023 (recommended a sidewalk be added in the future)

These are glimpses to where this program could go if the District traffic engineers embraced it. I think it could be quite possible to encourage this and see some rapid improvement in compliance. In my initial recommendations emailed to the MDOT SHA program coordinator, I recommended that simply adding a free-text field with the question: “In addition to deficiencies or corrections to existing infrastructure, are there additional crash reduction countermeasures that could reduce the likelihood of such crashes in the future?” I hope they have taken my recommendation, it would go a long way to setting a proactive safety mindset within MDOT SHA.

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1. ↩︎
2. ↩︎

Is MDOT SHA Complying with the Law?

In my posts on my Motivation for launching this website and within my Initial Recommendations to MDOT SHA, I reference my assessment that MDOT SHA is not in compliance with the law as written. Let’s dig a little deeper on that.

First – what does the law say? Here’s a link to the text of the law, reproduced here without the amendments/revision tracking.

Legal Requirements for Infrastructure Reviews
Transportation Article, Section 8-204.2

(A) THE ADMINISTRATION SHALL CONDUCT AN INFRASTRUCTURE REVIEW OF EACH PEDESTRIAN OR BICYCLIST FATALITY THAT OCCURS: 
(1) ON A STATE HIGHWAY; OR 
(2) AT AN INTERSECTION OF A STATE HIGHWAY AND ANOTHER HIGHWAY OR A MUNICIPAL STREET.

(B) THE ADMINISTRATION’S INFRASTRUCTURE REVIEW SHALL IDENTIFY: 
(1) DEFICIENCIES IN ENGINEERING, TRAFFIC CONTROL, AND TRAFFIC OPERATIONS; AND 
(2) APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND CRASH REDUCTION COUNTERMEASURES THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S BEST PRACTICES AND THE STATE’S VISION ZERO PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER SUBTITLE 10 OF THIS TITLE, IF WARRANTED

(C) IN CONDUCTING AN INFRASTRUCTURE REVIEW, THE ADMINISTRATION SHALL CONSIDER:
(1) HIGHWAY CONTEXT, SUCH AS PROXIMITY OF THE HIGHWAY TO MASS TRANSIT AND WHETHER THE HIGHWAY IS IN AN URBAN OR RURAL AREA; 
(2) THE DIFFERENT MODES OF TRANSPORTATION USING THE HIGHWAY
(3) PRIOR CRASHES IN THE VICINITY.

(D) THE ADMINISTRATION SHALL: 
(1) COMPLETE AN INFRASTRUCTURE REVIEW WITHIN 6 MONTHS AFTER BEING NOTIFIED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OF A PEDESTRIAN OR BICYCLIST FATALITY; AND 
(2) PUBLISH THE REVIEW ON ITS WEBSITE.

2022 HB254/SB 874 – State Highway Administration – Pedestrian and Bicyclist Fatalities – Infrastructure Review (Vision Zero Implementation Act of 2022)

To summarize this as a compliance table, how do I think MDOT SHA is doing at meeting the various requirements of this law?

Requirement	Compliance?	Comment
(A)(1) – Every Pedestrian or Bicycle fatality on a state highway	Compliant	As far as we know, no method to check for completeness
(A)(2) – Every Pedestrian or Bicycle fatality at the intersection of a municipal road and a state highway	Compliant	As far as we know, no method to check for completeness
(B)(1) – Infrastructure Review shall consider deficiencies in engineering, control or operations	Compliant
(B)(2) – Infrastructure Review shall identify appropriate corrective actions and crash reduction countermeasures	Partially compliant	Corrective actions – yes Crash reduction countermeasures – no
(C)(1) – Infrastructure Review, Administration shall consider highway context	Non-compliant	0 of 331 Infrastructure Reports incorporate the MDOT SHA’s identified Context for the area
(C)(2) – Infrastructure Review, Administration shall consider different modes of transportation using the highway	Non-compliant	I have not seen any review provide a summary of transportation modes using the highway
(C)(3) – Infrastructure Review, Administration shall consider prior crashes in the vicinity	Non-compliant	No effort is being made to consider the history of crashes in the area of the fatal crash
(D)(1) – SHA shall complete reviews within 6 months	Varies, trending non-compliant	After a strong start, MDOT SHA has lagged behind posting reviews.  At least one review was completed >6 months after the crash.
(D)(2) SHA shall publish reports on its website	Compliant to letter (but not spirit) of the law	They are published, but as dots on a map, so difficult to filter through.  Also, they are published at significant delay from report completion.

In general, MDOT SHA is maybe halfway to compliance with the law as it stands. This shows the limits of legislation, it requires the agency in question to want to be compliant and to properly implement the law. A significant element of my criticism of MDOT SHA comes from the parts of the law the administration is currently ignoring.

Section 8-204.2 (B) (2) – Identify Appropriate Corrective Actions and Crash Reduction Countermeasures

I rate MDOT SHA as Partially Compliant to this requirement. Which is a polite way to say “Non Compliant”. While I do not dispute that when MDOT SHA identifies a deficiency in the existing infrastructure, they identify the corrective action, I have yet to see a consideration of new crash reduction countermeasures. This is unconscionable.

During the development of this legislation, MDOT SHA testified that they already perform infrastructure reviews for fatal crashes². MDOT SHA also testified that they have launched a number of strategies to reduce fatalities on our state’s highways since the Maryland Vision Zero program was established in 2019³. The fact of the matter is, if we do nothing different, fatal crashes will continue. The statewide time-series of pedestrian fatalities bears that out, over the last 5 years the total number of fatalities has been 130, 124, 130, 125, 130. Highway deaths (from Interstates, US highways and Maryland highways) accounted for 110, 76, 96, 88, 90⁴.

In my opinion, the entire purpose of this infrastructure review law is contained in the second half of that “and” statement (my emphasis added):

(B) THE ADMINISTRATION’S INFRASTRUCTURE REVIEW SHALL IDENTIFY: … (2) APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND CRASH REDUCTION COUNTERMEASURES THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S BEST PRACTICES AND THE STATE’S VISION ZERO PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER SUBTITLE 10 OF THIS TITLE, IF WARRANTED

If you’ve read any of my reviews of the Infrastructure Reports, you realize that it’s not difficult to identify potentially applicable crash reduction countermeasures. The fact that MDOT SHA has never found a crash reduction countermeasure to add to a site in their first 33 reports shows why pedestrian fatalities are not decreasing in our state – there is no internal desire within MDOT SHA to make their highways safer for pedestrians. They will flout state law to avoid making such recommendations.

Section 8-204.2 (C)(1) – Infrastructure Review, Administration shall consider highway context

I find it very frustrating that MDOT SHA has developed a fairly comprehensive taxonomy of development contexts around their highways, a fact that they point out in their written testimony on this law, but yet they fail to use it in the infrastructure reviews. The map that they use to present the infrastructure reviews even has the MDOT SHA context overlay applied, so anyone looking at the reviews can tell, but nowhere does this appear in the infrastructure review itself.

I’ve been tracking the contexts and through the first 33 reports, Suburban and Suburban Activity Center are dominating the fatalities.

• A – Urban Core – 0 fatal crashes
• B – Urban – 0 fatal crashes
• C – Suburban Activity Center / Traditional Town Center – 14 fatal crashes
• D – Suburban – 18 fatal crashes
• E – Rural – 3 fatal crashes

Breakdown of MDOT SHA Contexts for the first 33 Fatality Infrastructure Reviews (source: my analysis of MDOT SHA Context overlay on Infrastructure Review website)

I would love to see an analysis of linear miles of SHA-maintained facilities per context type for the state, I suspect that a calculation of fatalities per mile of highway in each context would show Suburban Activity Center is disproportionately the site of fatal pedestrian crashes. This is data that I think MDOT SHA could produce, but they would first need to start adhering to the state law and tracking the development context at the location of the fatal crash.

Another reason to consider the context of the roadway where the fatality occurs is to provide guidance for potential crash reduction countermeasures. The diagram below illustrates MDOT SHA’s method for identifying crash reduction countermeasures – it starts with the Context Zone for the roadway.

When MDOT SHA says they are “Context Driven”, they specifically mean that countermeasures are selected based on their Context Driven Toolkit. Image source: MDOT SHA Context Driven Toolkit website

(C)(2) – Infrastructure Review, Administration shall consider different modes of transportation using the highway

MDOT SHA’s failure to comply with this section of the law demonstrates a significant bias in favor of private automobile use to the detriment of all other road users. I presume that MDOT SHA engineers arrive at the crash site in a motor vehicle, likely a state-owned motor vehicle, and would even hazard that the MDOT SHA engineers all commute to/from their district office by private motor vehicle. The highway engineers also appear to rely heavily on police reports, which are also filled out by officers who typically drive to the scene. With no conscious effort to examine how the roadway appears to other users, these infrastructure reviews presume that the highway is the sole province of the single occupancy motor vehicle. This ignores transit, bicycles, micro-mobility, para-transit and pedestrians as valid road users.

How does this reduce the effectiveness of MDOT SHA’s Fatality Infrastructure Reviews? I can not recall a single infrastructure review discussing bus stops along the highway or near the fatal crash site. However, I keep finding bus stops near fatal crashes. I honestly believe that the bus stop placement and the nearby crossing design decisions are contributing to these crashes. Meanwhile, MDOT SHA will not see this in their data because they are not complying with the law.

(C)(3) – Infrastructure Review, Administration shall consider prior crashes in the vicinity

Again, this is another clear omission from all of the Infrastructure Reviews that MDOT SHA has completed to date. It is as if each fatal crash is considered as an aberration, a surprising outcome that could never be anticipated. I do not possess the data to the contrary. At least, I don’t have the data to the contrary yet, it will certainly accumulate now that these reports are public.

However, I will point to information accumulated by other advocates – the Action Committee for Transit (ACT) identified one of these fatal crashes as occurring in what they call “Georgia Ave’s Death Zone” because it has seen 5 fatalities from 4 crashes in 2 years on 2 blocks. Also, in another case, the victim of the fatal crash had previously been hit and injured on the same stretch of road just a month prior to being hit and killed. Interestingly, I just realized that the second instance is just under a mile away from the first along MD-97 / Georgia Avenue.

MDOT SHA does suggest that you use the Maryland Crash Data Download portal maintained by the Maryland State Police. There is a lot of data available there, though it is unfortunately all located as latitude/longitude points – there’s no simple way to determine if a stretch of a highway is particularly unsafe for pedestrians. Or perhaps there is for a GIS professional and that’s why GPS coordinates are used? Either way, it’s clear that this information is available to MDOT SHA and could be used to provide further context to a fatal crash. Given that over the last 5 years the ratio of pedestrian injury crashes to fatal crashes is ~19:1, if MDOT SHA was reviewing pedestrian injury and fatal crash data within a quarter mile of the site in question, it could easily indicate that action is urgently required.

Just as a “for example”, I’ve circled the two fatal crashes I’ve reviewed along a stretch of Georgia Avenue from the Maryland Crash Data Portal for all injury or fatal crashes from 1/1/2019 – 10/6/2023. Some of these could be vehicle-vehicle crashes, there’s no way to filter that out on this portal, but when you look at this view, do these incidents seem to be aberrations?

Screen capture from Maryland Crash Data Download portal highlighting the two fatal pedestrian crashes reviewed against the background of all injury and fatal crashes reported by Montgomery County or Maryland State Police, time period filtered to 1/1/2019 – 10/6/2023.

Even if one only considered fatal crashes, there is a clear trend along MD-97 / Georgia Avenue in this section that is not present on nearby MD-185 / Connecticut Avenue.

Screen capture from Maryland Crash Data Download portal highlighting the two fatal pedestrian crashes reviewed against the background of all fatal crashes reported by Montgomery County or Maryland State Police, time period filtered to 1/1/2019 – 10/6/2023.

Based on my cursory review of the limited crash history information, I can tell that this stretch of MD-97 / Georgia Avenue appears to be very deadly. Although both of the prior reviews determined there to be a maintenance deficiency in the lighting, I would suggest that the data shows that limited maintenance actions will not prevent future crashes (and future fatal crashes along this corridor).

None of this analysis is presented in the report, because, again, MDOT SHA is ignoring this legal requirement.

(D)(1) – SHA shall complete reviews within 6 months

I have already commented on the 6-month review window in my blog post “Caught Up?” and I see nothing has changed since then. Since September 19th, 3 additional reports have been published (though the report on the map reads 35, there are 36 reports with indicators, I suspect that this is 35 pedestrian fatal crash reports and 1 cyclist fatal crash report). Perhaps Maryland really had an extremely safe 1st quarter of 2023, but Zero Deaths Maryland is reporting YTD fatal crashes running higher than the same point in 2022, so I doubt that’s why we have so few reports.

(D)(2) SHA shall publish reports on its website

I have graded MDOT SHA as “compliant to the letter, but not spirit, of the law” for this requirement. The reports are, indeed, published on a public website. This is good. I do like a visual, map-based presentation, that is helpful. However, the fact that there is no way to filter the data or find new reports makes it very cumbersome to use. At this point, I am basically taking screen shots of the map and total number of reports so I can tell where a new report has been added. And this is with fewer than half the reports that must be published annually. In the first year of the law. Eventually large swathes of the map will be covered in fatal crash icons and it will be impossible to find new reports.

This could be remedied with the addition of simple filters for “date of crash” and “date report published”. A better solution would be to also add a sortable/filterable index of the reports.

Summary

The Vision Zero Implementation Act of 2022 is a very good concept for a law. Infrastructure reviews can be an effective way to eliminate crashes or reduce their severity through the implementation of crash reduction countermeasures. But this process relies heavily on the quality and content of the review process. This is why the Maryland legislators wrote specific requirements on infrastructure review content into Sections B(2), C(1), C(2), and C(3) of the law. MDOT SHA’s non-compliance to these sections seriously undermines the quality and conclusions of their infrastructure reviews. As illustrated above, MDOT SHA has all of the information and resources necessary to comply with the law, but a full year into the law’s implementation all infrastructure reports from all SHA Districts are non-compliant to the statute.

This is a major reason why I do not believe MDOT SHA should retain authority to determine if a highway design is “safe” – the organization has not demonstrated the ability to properly review prior work, why should the public trust their review of new design work?

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1. When I began this post, there were only 33 Infrastructure Reviews posted. However, life came at me fast, so now I am no longer caught up with the MDOT SHA site. I’ve taken a cursory glance at the new reports and do not see major changes, but won’t count them until I’ve completed my analysis. ↩︎
2. “Once MDOT SHA is made aware of a fatality on a State road, our current practices include an infrastructure review at the location where the fatality occurred.” – see written testimony submitted by MDOT SHA for committee hearings on the legislation ↩︎
3. ibid ↩︎
4. Source: Maryland Highway Safety Office’s “Pedestrian On Foot Involved” Crash Statistics (from the Zero Death’s Maryland Crash Statistics website) ↩︎

Caught Up?

As far as I can tell (because the MDOT SHA Infrastructure Review site is being buggy tonight and refuses to show a total number of reports), I’m fully caught up with my reviews of the infrastructure reports. Actually, that’s not entirely true, my family drove past the aftermath of a fatal pedestrian crash on our way to Sunday morning brunch on a state-designated route near my home, so I’ve already put up some thoughts on the infrastructure at that intersection.

Still, MDOT SHA has published 33 Infrastructure Reviews as of Sunday; I’ve read them all and taken a second look based on what I can glean from publicly available reporting, satellite views, Google streetview, and my own personal experience.

Sadly, I know that MDOT SHA must be behind on meeting their obligation to publish these reports. Why? The law requires MDOT SHA to publish their Infrastructure Reports on the website within 6 months of being notified by law enforcement of the fatal crash. Given the crash date to review lag is often less than 2 weeks, I believe law enforcement is typically quite prompt at this. So in mid-September, we should expect to see Infrastructure Reports through mid-March at least. Instead, the latest report we have is from February 9th. In fact, for 2023 there are only 7 Infrastructure Reports published so far.

So how many reports should be published by now? Great question! MDOT SHA provides no guidance on how many backlogged reports they are working and Zero Deaths Maryland (the state’s Vision Zero organization housed under MDOT MVA in the Maryland Highway Safety Office¹) only publishes annual data in August of the following year. However, Zero Deaths Maryland’s Crash Statistics website does provide good data detail on Pedestrian Deaths (I’m focused on pedestrians here because they are the 32 of the 33 reports to date).

For the 5 years ending December 2022, Maryland has recorded very consistent levels of pedestrian death. The table below breaks out annual fatalities by Route Type².

Pedestrian Fatalities by Road Type³

MDOT SHA is developing Infrastructure Reports on Route Types IS, US, and MD; these total to an average of 93 annual deaths each year, 72.6% of the total fatal pedestrian crashes each year. Let that sink in for a minute. MDOT SHA clearly does not maintain the majority of linear miles of roadway in our state (I dearly wish I had that statistic!) but they account for over two-thirds of fatal pedestrian crashes each year. This is the sort of correlation that inspired the Vision Zero Implementation Act of 2022 and this blog. MDOT SHA has a deadly collection of roads and we must do something about it.

Back to trying to figure out how many overdue Infrastructure Reviews MDOT SHA has somewhere in their process. Zero Deaths Maryland provides a monthly break-out of fatal pedestrian crashes:

Pedestrian Fatalities by Month⁴

All right, so we would expect that from January through mid-March we would see ~27 fatal pedestrian crashes, with at least two-thirds of them on MDOT SHA-maintained roads. So we should expect around 18 Infrastructure Reports for Q1 2023 to be published by now. Instead we have 7.

So I think I can fairly say that while I am caught up, MDOT SHA is certainly not, they are falling behind their obligations.

Now that I am caught up and have this website, I think it’s time to start documenting some trends and what insights I’ve taken from this project so far over the next couple weeks. More to come…

UPDATE 10/23/2023

After attending the Maryland Department of Planning’s “Walktober” “Walkinar #3” (very good program, highly recommend) last week, I learned about the new Fatal Crash Dashboard from the Maryland State Highway Safety Office. I’d completely missed that this dashboard was added to the Crash Data page, it’s very good. It’s also updated at a faster pace than the static reports and it does allow some finer grain filtering. So now we can see that there were 28 fatal non-motorist crashes on State Roads in Q1 2023. Above I assumed “no improvement on 5-year average fatal crash trends” and estimated ~27 fatal crashes on state highways in the first quarter, very accurate

Non-Motorist Fatalities filtered for January-March 2023 on the new Fatal Crash Dashboard

I have 10 reports up on Q1 2023 and there’s 1 that I need to catch up on. So I believe that MDOT SHA is overdue on at least 17 infrastructure reports, plus everything from April 1-23 2023. There has been very little published over the last few weeks, the optimistic explanation would be that they are implementing improvements on reports and this has delayed publication.

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1. Yes, you read that correctly, the Maryland Highway Safety Office (MHSO) is part of the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) within the Maryland Department of Transportation (MDOT). It is NOT part of the MDOT’s State Highway Administration that actually builds and maintains highways. ↩︎
2. The key to reading the route type is not provided, but I’ve previously corresponded with the office and they (very promptly) provided the definitions (comments from 4/10/2023):
   IS = Interstate
   US = US Highway
   MD = Maryland State Highway
   CO = County
   MU = Municipal (Generally speaking, this would be a road maintained by a town or city, whereas a CO road is maintained by a county agency.)
   GV = Government Road
   SR = Service Road
   OP = Other Public Road
   Balto. City CY = Baltimore City – (Baltimore City maintains its own roads)
   Parking Lots = Generally speaking, most of the parking lot area is not considered a public trafficway (see the definition of a trafficway, with the parking lot exclusion: ANSID D 16 standards)
   Unknown= The state of Maryland has transitioned to using GPS coordinates in ACRS to identify crash locations.  The unknowns in these reports represent a statistical program that pre-dates the transition to ACRS. ↩︎
3. Source: Maryland Highway Safety Office’s “Pedestrian On Foot Involved” Crash Statistics (from the Zero Death’s Maryland Crash Statistics website) ↩︎
4. Source: Maryland Highway Safety Office’s “Pedestrian On Foot Involved” Crash Statistics (from the Zero Death’s Maryland Crash Statistics website ↩︎